Now the security-fix releases are behind us, let's briefly talk about the ramifications.
The recent Git/Hg vulnerability on case-insensitive or normalizing filesystems are serious for people who fetch and integrate (either pull or pull --rebase) from untrusted sources.
When you grab a tree that records a malicious path, say, ".Git/hooks/post-checkout" using an older version of Git on such a filesystem (e.g. Windows NTFS or Mac OS X HFS+), Git will tell the filesystem to check it out at ".Git/hooks/post-checkout", but the filesystem overwrites a file different from what Git asked it to write, namely ".git/hooks/post-checkout", which is a path reserved for you to store an executable hook that is run after running "git checkout".
For an attacker to victimize you through this vector, the attacker has to have a write access to a repository you pull from. As long as you do not interact with untrustworthy strangers (e.g. only pull from the projects' official history), you will not be affected. That is often true in corporate setting, where the access to the central repository everybody in the product group uses is tightly controlled, and if an untrustworthy stranger has a write access there, you already have a bigger problem.
But the open-source is all about collaboration, and we need to meet and interact with new people every day while doing so. The prudent thing to do is to (1) update to the version of Git recently released to work around this issue, and then (2) respond to a pull request from a stranger, in this order. Don't do it the other way around!
Thanks.
Monday, December 22, 2014
Thursday, December 18, 2014
Git 1.8.5.6, 1.9.5, 2.0.5, 2.1.4 and 2.2.1 and thanking friends in Mercurial land
We have a set of urgent maintenance releases. Please update your Git if you are on Windows or Mac OS X.
Git maintains various meta-information for its repository in files in .git/ directory located at the root of the working tree. The system does not allow a file in that directory (e.g. .git/config) to be committed in the history of the project, or checked out to the working tree from the project. Otherwise, an unsuspecting user can run git pull from an innocuous-looking-but-malicious repository and have the meta-information in her repository overwritten, or executable hooks installed by the owner of that repository she pulled from (i.e. an attacker).
Unfortunately, this protection has been found to be inadequate on certain file systems:
Credit for discovering this issue goes to our friends in the Mercurial land (most notably, the inventor of Hg, Matt Mackall himself). The fixes to this issue for various implementations of Git (including mine, libgit2, JGit), ports using these implementations (including Git for Windows, Visual Studio) and also Mercurial have been coordinated for simultaneous releases. GitHub is running an updated version of their software that rejects trees with these confusing and problematic paths, in order to protect its users who use existing versions of Git (also see their blog post).
A huge thanks to all those who were involved.
New releases of Git for Windows, Git OSx Installer, JGit and libgit2 have been prepared to fix this issue. Microsoft (which uses libgit2 in their Visual Studio products) and Apple (which distributes a port of Git in their Xcode) both have fixes, as well.
For people building from the source, fixed versions of Git have been released as versions v1.8.5.6, v1.9.5, v2.0.5, v2.1.4, and v2.2.1 for various maintenance tracks.
Thanks.
Git maintains various meta-information for its repository in files in .git/ directory located at the root of the working tree. The system does not allow a file in that directory (e.g. .git/config) to be committed in the history of the project, or checked out to the working tree from the project. Otherwise, an unsuspecting user can run git pull from an innocuous-looking-but-malicious repository and have the meta-information in her repository overwritten, or executable hooks installed by the owner of that repository she pulled from (i.e. an attacker).
Unfortunately, this protection has been found to be inadequate on certain file systems:
- You can commit and checkout to .Git/<anything> (or any permutations of cases .[gG][iI][tT], except .git all in lowercase). But this will overwrite the corresponding .git/<anything> on case-insensitive file systems (e.g. Windows and Mac OS X).
- In addition, because HFS+ file system (Mac OS X) considers certain Unicode codepoints as ignorable; committing e.g. .g\u200cit/config, where U+200C is such an ignorable codepoint, and checking it out on HFS+ would overwrite .git/config because of this.
Credit for discovering this issue goes to our friends in the Mercurial land (most notably, the inventor of Hg, Matt Mackall himself). The fixes to this issue for various implementations of Git (including mine, libgit2, JGit), ports using these implementations (including Git for Windows, Visual Studio) and also Mercurial have been coordinated for simultaneous releases. GitHub is running an updated version of their software that rejects trees with these confusing and problematic paths, in order to protect its users who use existing versions of Git (also see their blog post).
A huge thanks to all those who were involved.
New releases of Git for Windows, Git OSx Installer, JGit and libgit2 have been prepared to fix this issue. Microsoft (which uses libgit2 in their Visual Studio products) and Apple (which distributes a port of Git in their Xcode) both have fixes, as well.
Thanks.
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